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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR 
The map on the front cover of this issue shows 
the military situation. It has been drawn from three 
maps that recently reached L 1sbon from East Timor, 
and have been made public by Fretflin. Jill Jolliffe 
has attempted to evaluate their significance. Though 
they cannot be authenticated, in her view the maps 
are consistent with each other and with independent 
sources of information, and there is no prfma facte 
reason to believe they are forgeries or inaccurate. 
Inside : page 2 
New maps of 
the military 
situation 
The Fretilin office in Lisbon has published three 
new maps of the military situation in East Timor. 
The first was captured from the · Indonesian armed 
forces a year ago on 3 June 1985. It is written in 
bahasa Indonesian and purports to show the disposit-
ion of Falintil forces {Fretilin) in March 1985. 
Our map therefore shows {the shaded areas marked 
on the key as Falintil/Fretilin base areas) not the 
areas which Fretilin claims to control but the Ind-
onesian army's view of Falintil/Fretilin strength. 
There is no reason to question the provenance of 
the second and third maps, both of which were pre-
pared by Fretil in within East Timor. The second of 
the 3 maps shows Fretilin's own view of the military 
situation, including zones under Indonesian control, 
zones under Falintil control and also the position 
of resettlement areas {called "concentration camps" 
by Falint1l) in which very many T1morese civilians 
have been relocated by the military administration. 
The third map, again prepared by Fretilin, shows 
the disposition of the Indonesian armed forces in 
some detail. It distinguishes between large and 
smaller military units and identifies where Indon-
esian artillery or armoured units are positioned. 
This map is dated January 1986 and therefore claims 
to give a more recent view than the Indonesian 
military map describing Fretilin positions. 
The map reproduced on our cover thus shows the 
Indonesian military's assumptions about Fretilin 
strength in June 1985; and Fretilin assumptions 
about the disposition of Indonesian military forces 
at the end of1'985. 
Conclusions 
• The Indonesian map suggests that Fret1l in-
Fal int fl does indeed operate in organised units 
throughout most of East Timor, excepting the area 
west of a line drawn between Oil i and the South 
Coast below Suai {this area is blank on our map). 
The Indonesian map implies this band of 
territory running along the border with West 
Timor is entirely under Indonesian control. 
Freti l in, in contrast {Map 2), affirms that 3 
mobile guerrilla groups {autonomous units) 
operate here; in fact, there have been separate 
reports of bombing and shelling in these 
districts. 
• Several Falintil/Fretilin commanders named in the 
original map are people known to have been 
Fretilin leaders in 1975 {for exa8')1e David Alex, 
Miguel dos Santos, Xa Na Na himself); others are 
new. This tends to confirm that there has been 
continuity; and also that Fretilin has recruited 
new leaders and is not dependent on a rump of 
survivors from 1975. 
• Taken together the 3 maps give us some idea of 
the areas which are most subject to fighting. Map 
3 is particularly informative. If it is accurate, 
Jill Jolliffe argues, it 
"i. implicitly defines the areas of greatest Ind-
onesian military concern. Apart from the 
strongly-fortified capital, the main focus of 
forces is along the north-south line from 
Baucau to Viqueque, where there is a high rep-
resentation of regular forces, combined with 
the Timorese battalions 744/745, tank and 
artillery units. Everywhere east of this line 
appears militarily busy (or at least prepared 
to be), although the south coast area west of 
this line, until Ainaro and Same, is also 
fairly densely policed. Regular Indonesian 
units in isolated interior posts tend to have 
relatively high-ranking commanders, and to be 
supported by artillery units {eg at Iliomar, 
Luro, Quelicai, Uatolari, Uaime and Barique). 
ii. The highest density of artillery units is 
concentrated in all of the area east of the 
Baucau-Viqueque line and the south coast area 
west of Viqueque {Barique, Dilor, south of 
Dilor), suggesting areas of higher activity. 
iii. From the evidence of these maps and drawing on 
previous reports, especially the captured Ind-
onesian military document of 1982, in so far . 
as any patterns emerge, 'trouble spots' can be 
cautiously identified as: the districts around 
Saelari, Uatolari, Ossu, Viqueque, Venilale, 
Barique, Fato Berliu, Dilor, Soibada and Same. 
iv. The Indonesian military dispositions described 
are almost certainly post-1983, dating from 
their re-organisation after the breakdown of 
the cease-fire with Fretilin in August of that 
year. Fretilin reports of regular artillery 
and aerial bombardment date from after that 
time - a feature of the war between 1976 and 
1979, but not so much in the years '80-'83. 
The principal Indonesian strategy post-1983 
seems to have been to try and build a sort of 
gate across the island, from Baucau to 
Viqueque. 
v. Apart from Ainaro and Same, there appears to 
be little activity in the areas south and 
south-east of Dili. Tank and artillery units 
are spread thinly in this area. 
vi. None of the maps refer to the stationing of 
aircraft, although Baucau is known from 
earlier reports to be the principal base of 
the Northrop F5 and Bronco OV-10 bombers and 
helicopters which conduct the air war. Reports 
on the incidence of aerial bombardment would 
be useful to complete the military picture 
provided by these maps." 
Note 
We have summarised here J il 1 Jolliffe' s main con-
c 1 us ions. Her "Rough Notes Towards an Analysis of 
the Military Situation in East T1mor" was published 
as an Occasional Report by Timor Newsletter in 
April. A photocopy can be obtained on request from 
East Timor Link for 12.50 if you live within Europe 
and for £2.80 if you live outside Europe (inclusive 
of postage by air; 20 pages including copies of the 
original maps and documentation. Readers should note 
that the original maps were drawn in colour and do 
not reproduce well in photocopy). 
NEWS FROM INSIDE 
Overview 
by John Taylor 
Refugees arriving recently in Lisbon have report-
ed that the Indonesian army is preparing for a new 
offensive. They said it would begin in May; but this 
has not been confirmed and other reports suggest a 
new offensive is unlikely in view of the importance 
of diplomatic activity between now and the end of 
the year, both in the United Nations and in the Non-
A l igned Movement (see separate articles). 
Interviewed in Lisbon in April, Fretilin's rep-
resentative at the United Nations, Jose Ramos Horta 
estimated that Indonesia currently has 10,000 elite 
troops and 10-15,000 other soldiers in East Timor. 
He claimed that some 600 Indonesian soldiers had 
been killed in combat every six months during the 
last two years. Whether this claim is accurate or 
not, there does seem to have been serious fighting 
recently. 
A Paz e Poss1vel em T1mor Leste reports in its 
May is sue that a new Indonesian bata ll ion has been 
posted to Timor, which includes a company of heavy 
artillery. Another has been placed at Laclo in the 
region of Atsabe, near the Ramelau mountains. 
A letter received by the former Apostolic Admin-
istrator of Dili, Mgr da Costa Lopes, (see elsewhere 
in this issue) states that fighting has been heavy 
in the areas of Lospalos, Baucau, Viqueque, A1naro, 
Manatuto, Same and Bobonaro. The writer claimed that 
" ••• the resistance forces continue to control the 
greater part of the territory." 
In early February the Matabian mountain range in 
the eastern sector was encircled, and was strafed by 
ground-attack aircraft. The Indonesian command hoped 
to capture Fretilin's President Xanana Gusmao, who 
was based temporarily in the area. 
Tapol reports (May issue) that this attack was 
undertaken on the orders of the new commander in 
East Timor, Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, who replaced 
Colonel Rahardjo in December 1985. Colonel Rahardjo 
had been in post for less than a year. 
The failure of this campaign and the severity of 
the fighting seem to have had a demoralising effect 
on Indonesian troops. Mgr Lopes' informant reported 
that the commanders of two batallions were called to 
the regional headquarters in Denpasar, Bali, because 
their troops had refused to advance in battle. 
Typhoon 
It is becoming clear that much damage was caused by 
a typhoon which hit East Timor earlier this year. 
News has filtered through from several sources - but 
virtually no details have been made available. The 
extent of the damage was indirectly confirmed by 
Governor Carrascalao. When he briefed the press 
during his meetings with the Indonesian Minister of 
Social Affairs in April, he reported that 4,000 
houses had been destroyed in the area of Ainaro. 
Strategic Village Surveillance 
Conditions appear to be worsening in some of the 
strategic villages, particularly those in the south 
and east. In addition to constant military surveill-
. ance and forced guard duty for camp residents, ca!ll>S 
have apparently been encircled with barbed wire and 
all residents have to be within this fenced area 
from 5 pm until the · following morning. During the 
night they are forced to sleep outside their homes. 
Further reports describe the moving of prisoners 
from Atauro island to strategic villages designed 
specifically for close surveillance - despite offic-
ial assurances in 1985 that those raoved from Atauro 
were being released. A case in point is the village 
of Purgoa, in Cailaco, which contains prisoners from 
Atauro who originate from Viqueque, Lospalos and 
Baucau. (See also the review in this issue of the 
1986 ICRC Report.) 
Fretilin's Political Perspective 
A group of young Timorese recently received a 
letter from Xanana Gusmao. He stated succinctly the 
independence movement's position: •our political 
perspective exists in a framework of the principles 
of political plural ism, a mixed economy, and non-
alignment. We are a small population, of whom more 
than one third have already been exterminated, and a 
poor, underdeveloped country, with all aspects of 
underdevelopment highlighted; a people and a country 
who want their children to be happy, free and inde-
pendent and for whom the land must become prosperous 
and independent.• The 1 etter is dated 23 January 
· 1986 and was received in Jakarta a month 1 ater, 
before arriving in Lisbon. (The text is available 
from A Paz e Possivel em Timor-Leste.) 
Catholics in East Timor: the latest figures. 
Here are the most recent figures we possess about 
the number of clergy and Catholics in Dili diocese. 
1975 1984 
Population 688 769 578 000 
Number of Catholics 220 310 438 000 
Clergy 
Priests (total) 44 36 
Diocesians 33 18 
Jesuit missionaries 6 3 
Salesian missionaries 16 8 Canossians 32 
Dominican Sisters 16 
Carmelites 4 
Sacred Family 4 
Society of the Divine Word 7 
Sisters (5 orders) 48 
Letter from 
limor 
We reprint excerpts of a persona~ letter dated 20 
February 1986 addressed to Mgr Martinho da Costa 
Lopes. who was the Apostolic Administrator (Acting 
Bishop) in East Timor between 1977 and 1983. 
Fighting 
Mainly in the areas of Lospalos. Baucau. Viqueque, 
Manatuto, Same, Ainaro and Bobonaro the actions of our 
guerrillas have been taking place most intensely in 
the months January, March, April, November and 
December of 1985, causing the invader many dead and 
wounded and capturing rriany modern arms. At the present 
moment the resistance forces continue to control the 
greater part of the territory, staying close to the 
villages and concentration camps. Some guerrillas were 
captured. Some of them were put into the Dili Comarca 
prison. others are in the hands of the regional milit-
ary or the Red Berets (Indonesian elite units). Among 
those who disappeared is Cecilia Ximenes, who was 
captured in Lospalos with a weapon at the beginning of 
last year. After being tortured for a long time, it 
has been said that she "disappeared" in the regional 
military cornnand. Chico Belo, who was captured in 
Venilale in the middle of last year, •disappeared• in 
the regional military cornnand of Baucau. Domi;ngos fell 
into the hands of the enemy in Ainaro on Dece er 24, 
1985 and he just "disappeared". 
On February ·6, 7 and 8, Indonesian forces encircled 
the stony mountain range of Matebia with the help of 
the air force, intending to capture Fretilin leader 
Xanana who was there at that time. On the first day of 
the attack 9 dead Indonesian soldiers arrived at the 
cemetery of Dili. On the second and on the third day 
of the attack 8 dead Indonesian soldiers arrived at 
that cemetery. We do not know how many were buried in 
Baucau and how many were transported directly to Java 
on a Hercules-C 130 transport plane. On our side there 
were no casualties. Daily there is no lack of dead 
bodies for the (Indonesian military) cemetery in Dili. 
A new cemetery was built between Baucau and Uailili 
and is also almost full. The ~Dr Carvalho" central 
hospital is overflowing with wounded and mutilated 
Indonesian soldiers. 
The Indonesian soldiers are demoralized and fed up 
with the war. Many Indonesian officers are already 
aware that Indonesia is militarily and politically 
unable to dominate the situation. Some Indonesians 
say: "We are just awaiting the order for withdrawal. 
Indonesia cannot row against the tide of this world•. 
Two conmanders of battalions were called to Denpasar 
(Bali-military conmand headquarters) just a few days 
ago because their men had refused to advance into 
battle. Many of them are participating in various ways 
actively and effectively in our struggle. This is 
true. That is why they try to arm the sons of East 
Timor to have them fight against their own brothers. 
In the villages and concentration camps the East 
Timorese people continue to offer passive resistance, 
actively supporting the armed resistance under all 
circumstances. The enemy himself knows that this is 
how things are. The East Timorese people are conscious 
of the need to participate in the struggle in order to 
free our country of Indonesia's colonial rule and end 
for good the suffering imposed by the occupier. Today 
many of those who hold important positions in the 
present society and who had asked for int~gration with 
Indonesia recognise that the struggle of Fretilin is just and they participate in various ways in that 
struggle. 
Murders 
Against the passive and effective resistance of 
East Timor's people, the enemy retaliates with persec-
ution, torture, imprisonments and sunmary executions. 
During the last year the enemy carried out executions 
in East Timor. We shall mention a few cases that we 
know of directly: 
1. On October 19, 1985 three young men were killed in 
Kelikai by battalion No. 724: Juliao, 18 years old, 
Tadeu Ximenes, 17 years old, and Victor Ximenes. 
They were killed at a placed called Sula Nau. 
In Laga 10 people were killed, among them Tomas who 
had recently arrived from Atauro island prison. 
Another man who had recently arrived from the 
Atauro prison island was killed in Baguia. 
2. In Venilale three boys were killed guarding their 
cattle. Still more recently a local chief and his 
son were killed when they returned from their 
gardens which are about 3 kilometres away from the 
village. The Indonesian guards did not bother to 
look at their passes ••• In a few seconds two lives 
ceased to exist. How many of these cases exist 
throughout East Timorl On January 31, 1986 many 
people were imprisoned in Kelicai and Laga. After 
two weeks of torture 8 of them were brought to the 
central prison in Dili, the others were told to go 
home. The names of the 8 people are: Luis Maria, 
Felix Ximenes, David Ximenes, Justino and Manual (Ke11ca1 of the Abafala village) Cristovao Ximenes 
and Carlos (Laga of the Atelari vfl lage) - one na.11e 
is missing. 
3. In the middle of 1985 many people were imprisoned 
in Soibada together with the local chief. The Ind-
onesians searched the residence of Father Mateus. 
The imprisoned people were beaten, whipped, burnt 
with cigarettes. etc. The local chief and Jose Vong 
were brought to the conmando of the Red Berets in 
Dili. Father Mateus intervened at high levels of 
the civil and military administration in Dili and 
the case reached the office of Benni Murdani (Conm-
ander of the Indonesian Armed Forces). He ordered 
some of his officers to investigate the case. The 
local chief and the other man were sent back home. 
Political prisoners 
Until the middle of September 1985 there were 177 
political prisoners in the Comarca prison in Dili (Bek'ora and Kaikol 1), some of whom had been tried and 
others not. 43 other political prisoners were sent to 
Jakarta's central prison Cipinnang. The number of 
prisoners in the regional military cornnands (Koramil 
and Kodim), in the hands of the Red Berets, in the 
central military conmands is unknown. On December 24, 
1985 B. Murdani freed 15 military men and policemen 
from the Caicol1 Comarca Prison, all of whom were 
reintegrated into the service. We are certain that 
there are hundreds of East Timorese political prison-
ers who have been brought to various Indonesian 
islands, but their whereabouts is unknown. Many of 
them were said to have disappeared 1979, 1980 and 
mainly 1983. 
At present there are about ~ prisoners in the 
concentration caq> on Atauro. 936 of them are from 
Viqueque and 1 is from Lospalos. They have been 
separated from their families for over 5 years. During 
the last year the prisoners from the Manatuto and Same 
districts have been freed. 
On June 28, 1985 a total of 32 people, men, women 
and one child, were sent to the Caicoli prison. One of 
them, called Jeremias Meneses, died on November 19 
after being tortured. 
In the Pur oa concentration cam in Cailaco are 
those prisoners rom t e areas o aucau, Viqueque and 
Lospalos who have been sent away from Atauro. Their 
conditions in this camp are a little better, but they 
are not allowed to go home. 
Prisoners from various parts of the country have 
been concentrated fn Afleu. After a recent visit by 
the wives of the Governor and the Military Conrnander 
things there have become a little better. 
In the prisons on the other coast, of Dotik, Haili-
kou and Maliana things are as before. 
Living Conditions in the Interior 
If you go through the villages of Luro, Laivai, 
Tutuala, lliomar, Uatolari, Cajularan, Lacluta, etc., 
you will see that the people live in a state of 
permanent encirclement. They are not allowed to go 
more than three kilometres outside their villages. In 
addition, they always have to have a "pass" issued by 
the Indonesian military authorities. It happens easily 
that East Timorese are accused of having contacts with 
the guerrillas, and then they inrnediat- ely become 
victims of torture, massacres, etc. The people live in 
huts but at night they are forced to sleep in ditches 
inside and outside of the hut. The people live in 
constant fear. The Javanese, however, filled with 
fear, hide themselves. The militia control the night. 
In Uatolari the Indonesians set up barbed wire around 
the center of the village. At 5 o'clock in the 
afternoon the whole population has to be in this 
fenced-off area. This way it is evident that the 
people continue to be severely hit by hunger. Their 
gardens and plantations are abandoned. They live like 
cattle at gun point. 
Journalists and other international observers have 
said that the East Timorese situation regarding food 
and education has improved, but that is a short 
sighted view of the overall situation in East Timor. 
Why? The reason is simple. Firstly, all foreigners who 
arrive here are led around by members of the Indon-
esian military secret police. The foreigners only 
obtain information that is convenient for the Indon-
esian authorities. Secondly, the Indonesians only 
allow visits to places that are convenient for them. 
The people continue to die of hunger, of torture 
and of massacres ••• A lot of starvation is foreseeable 
for the current year because the little corn that has 
been planted has been destroyed by heavy winds. 
Health 
As soon as you leave Dili you will ffnd a truly sad 
situation: the lack of medicine. Where it exists at 
all, it is extremely rare. The people have no money to 
buy it. And only people who have rupias are treated. 
In fact the rupf a is the basis for everything. For 
everything you have to pay a "uang roko" (money for 
cigarettes): to get a simple signature on a pass or on 
a document giving access to the civil service, you 
always have to pay a bribe. 
Officials of the state family ~lanning ~rogranme (keluarga berencana) are presentn everyittle 
village and hamlet to make people limit their number 
of children and each family is only allowed to have 
three children. In the interior the military force our 
women to receive injections and "pills" are being 
distributed to them for the same effect. All the women 
are forced to take part in this. It is one way the 
enemy has to make our ethnic identity disappear ••• 
Dili is the biggest center in terms of population 
and--:rt""is also a source of corruption and alienation. 
The insecurity of their 1 ives, as well as hunger and 
sickness, cause people to gather in the capital, which 
now numbers about 80,000 inhabitants including the 
Indonesians who have come to live there. 
The town is large enough to give a certain security 
to all those who for political reasons are being per-
secuted in the mountains. The impossibility of earning 
a living on their land because of an encirclement that 
grows tighter and tighter causes many others to come 
to the town to earn a living ••• But nowadays living in 
the town becomes more and more difficult ••• 
The Church 
The Catholic Church in East Timor continues to be 
the hope of the martyred people. In difficult times 
the Church has tried to ease the suffering and pain of 
our people morally and materially, within its poss-
ibilities. In difficult circumstances the Church has 
contributed inmensely to our struggle for liberation. 
This is a fact the East Timorese people will not 
easily forget. The Church has saved more than a few 
lives. The Church identified itself with the East 
Timorese people. That is why the Church also suffers 
with its people. How often were its ministers objects 
of severe criticism and bad treatment on the part of 
the occupier! 
On February 1, 1986, a telegram sent from Ossu 
ordered the inmediate imprisonment of Father Hilario 
Madeira, who was then in the Ecclesiastical Chamber. 
The case was brought to the Governor's office. 
However, the Church continues to walk at the side of 
its people, living the same sufferings and sharing the 
same hopes. 
PORTUGUESE POLITICIA1NS ANO TIMOR 
In its May issue, A Paz e Possivel em Timor Leste 
reports on a strengthening of political attitudes in 
Lisbon. Deputies from all the main parties, includ-
ing the Social Democrats who are in government, have 
said that Portugal's consensus in favour of East 
Timor should be translated into diplomatic action. 
An early initiative may be to put the issue to a 
vote in the European Parliament. 
A Paz e Possivel notes that "Portugal's entry 
into the European Conmunity provides an exceptional 
occasion to ask for support from its partners, who 
generally abstain when the problem of East Timor is 
put to the vote in the UN. Since member countries of 
the Conmunity try to act together on foreign policy 
matters, Portugal can invoke the Portuguese constit-
ution and the United Nations Charter to change their 
vote. 
"Support from the European Conrnunity would be im-
portant not only because of poss i b 1e votes at the 
UN, but also because the Conmunity has other ways of 
bringing pressure on Indonesia. Falls in the price 
of oil (50~ of Indonesian exports) and copper (Ind-
onesia is the world's second largest producer) make 
the government in Jakarta more dependent on its 
donors, among which the countries of the European 
Conrnunity are among the most important.• 
REVIEW 
TRANSMIGRATION 
"By way of transmigration, we will try to realise 
what has been pledged, to integrate all the ethnic 
groups into one nation ••• The different ethnic 
groups will in the 1 ong run disappear because of 
integration ••• and there will be one kind of man.• 
This statement on March 20 1985 by the Indonesian 
Minister of Transmigration, Mr Martano, expresses 
succinctly the aim of the government's trans-
migration progranme. The specific objective is to 
move the landless poor from Indonesia's over-
populated central islands of Java, Lombok, Bali and 
Madura to the less densely populated •outer islands" 
of Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia. The government 
plans to move no less than 65 million of its 160 
million inhabitants in the next twenty years. The 
progra11111e is supported by the World Bank. 
The latest issue of The Ecologist magazine, 
entitled "Banking on Disaster•. assesses the pro-
gra11111e. It argues that transmigration w11 l have a 
disastrous impact on Indonesia's tropical rain 
forest: some 3.3 m. hectares will be destroyed by 
the end of the current five year plan in 1989. 
Transmigration policies are also destroying the 
basis of the way of life of societies outside Java. 
In addition, the report criticises the pol icy for 
relocating groups of people primarily for defence or 
co11111ercial purposes. 
Transmigration is very relevant for East Timor's 
people. Since the end of the 'encirclement and 
annihilation' campaigns in 1979, the Indonesian 
military have been resettling people in villages 
away from their regions of origin. This is largely 
for security purposes, but it has a further rat-
ionale because resettlement is being accompanied by 
economic changes under which traditional agriculture 
is being replaced by cultivation of cash crops. The 
ultimate purpose is to create an export oriented 
rural sector, based on labour drawn from the re-
settlement villages. 
This policy not only involves forcibly relocating 
a substantial proportion of the population within 
East Timor, but is also expected to involve trans-
migrating large numbers of Indonesians into East 
Timor and 1 arge numbers of Timorese to other parts 
of Indonesia. Already, Balinese landless families 
have been moved to areas such as Ma11ana, to tend 
rice fields and 'demonstrate• their techniques to 
Timorese farmers. The pace of i11111igration is to 
increase in coming years·. People working on trans-
migration progranmes have likewise reported that 
East Timorese families have been moved to Kalimantan 
and Irian Jaya (West Papua), and that plans exist to 
move families to Sumatra. 
For anyone interested in these issues, this issue 
of the Ecologist (Vol. 16 No 2/3) is essential read-
ing. The magazine (59 pages, photos, maps) can be 
ordered from Worthyvale Manor, Camelford, Cornwall 
PL32 9TT, UK and is priced at 14. 
Mr Mochtar Kusumaatmaja on Access to East Timor 
In an interview reported in Kompas, the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister said that progress was 
good and that East Timor is now more open. The 
Western press Kc:fPas reported him as saying, has 
considerable free om to visit East Timor. (Kompas, 
29 March 1986) 
The main difficulty, he said, lay in the fact 
that foreign journalists expected to travel by 
helicopter rather than by less expensive forms of 
transport. 
This does not correspond to information :hat Ea~t 
T1mor Link has received, according to which it is 
more difficult than ever to visit East Timor. Extra 
passes are needed in Bali, more permits in Dili, and 
every visitor is required to report before departing 
as well as on arrival. 
As for the helicopters, we too are in favour of 
reducing the expense of foreign visits and agree 
that journalists should be encouraged to travel by 
road. and see the situation on the ground rather 
than from the air ••• Perhaps now the Indonesian 
authorities will take steps to allow reporters to 
stay two weeks instead of two days in the territory! 
CHURCH RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA 
A Paz e Possivel reports that in October 1985 Mr 
Sudharmono, General Secretary of Golkar (the govern-
ment party in Indonesia) was present when Mgr Belo, 
head of East Timor's Catholic church, blessed a new 
shrine dedicated to Our Lady of Comoro in Dili. The 
shrine was funded by an Indonesian Muslim. 
Mr Sudharmono was visiting East Timor to prepare 
the 1987 elections, and Mgr Belo used the occasion 
to remind his visitor of the need to repect the 
religious identity of Timor's people. 
According to A Paz e Possivel. "The presence of 
this important political figure at a religious cere-
mony and at the meal which followed did not pass un-
noticed by Timorese. They linked it with the Indon-
esian authorities• recent offers of financial help 
for construction of a parish church at Villa Verde (Dili) and even a new Cathedral. These offers would 
be tied directly to agreement from Mgr Belo to in-
corporate the diocese of Dili within the Indonesian 
Bishops' Conference." 
Mr Yusuf Wanandi. Director of the influential 
Centre for International & Strategic Studies in 
Jakarta, also met Mgr Belo recently. He is reported 
"to have promised help to bu11d churches in Dili and 
to have promised to secure authorisation for the 
entry of more Salesian missionaries (Mgr Belo's 
Order), if Mgr Belo accepted integration of the 
diocese within Indonesia." A Paz e Possivel adds 
that three Salesian priests (a Filipino, an Indian 
and a Spaniard) were authorised to work in Timor at 
the beginning of this year. 
On Aid and the Politics of Aid 
Further evidence of the difficulties faced by 
the people of East Timor, even those living in the 
urban centres, was provided recently by no less than 
the Governor himself, Mr Mario Carrascalao, when he 
was hosting the visit of the Indonesian Minister for 
Social Affairs, Ms Nani Soedarsono. 
He is reported in Kompas to have told her that 
20,000 orphans, 13,000 widows, 7 ,000 aged and sick 
people and 3,000 prostitutes are registered for 
relief and financial assistance. This figure, which 
presumably takes account of only a proportion of 
those in need, and probably excludes many conmun-
ities in the rural areas, represents over 7% of the 
entire population. 
Carrascalao is also reported to have said that 
"All of us know that these social problems are a 
priority, but we are afraid to report them". 
One wonders how acceptable these words are to the 




REAGAN'S VISIT TO BALI - Part 1 
Preceded by the usual gale of advance publicity, 
on April 29 President Reagan arrived in Bali on his 
way to meet Western industrial leaders in Japan. As 
he 1 ikes to do, the American president launched a 
banner headline to capture the spirit of his trip: 
his visit to Asia was to be propelled by "the winds 
of freedom". 
Trumpeted before him, this phrase died in Bali. 
Relations between Australia and Indonesia have never 
been easy - not least because many Australians, in-
cluding a surprising number of diplomats and defence 
officials, fear that Indonesia has expansionist de-
signs on their continent. Under the Hawke government 
relations had been improving: Australia has 
helpfully accepted Indonesia's de facto occupation 
of East Timor and begun to reach agreement over 
disputed oil bearing areas in the Timor Sea. 
Just a few days before the Reagan visit, however, 
a new crisis broke out. First of all, the Sldney 
Morning Herald published an analysis of the pr vate 
wealth of the Soehartos, comparing Indonesia's First 
Family to Mr and Mrs Marcos in the Philippines. The 
article contained no dramatic new revelations. None-
theless, it so piqued the government in Jakarta -
considered by foreign journalists to be among the 
most censorious in Asia - that reporting rights were 
refused to the entire Australian press corps, and a 
party of Australian tourists, innocently preparing 
for play in Bali, were sent packing. 
Their return - sans holiday, sans sun, sans 
everything - caused a furore in the Australian pop-
ular papers, and the incident was seriously chilling 
Indonesian-Australian relations as The President 
flew into Bali from Guam. 
Indonesia's decision, at this point, to expel 
from the presidential cavalcade two Australian journalists (neither of whom had anything to do with 
the Sidney Morning Herald) and Barbara Crossette of 
the New York Times, seems astonishingly inept. Even 
the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Kusumaatmaja, a 
relatively liberal figure in Indonesian politics, 
appeared unable to find the words to explain ft. 
It inmediately focussed attention on human rights 
and press freedoms during a visit the Reagans had 
expected to be amicable and relaxed. US statements 
had made it clear that East Timor and human rights 
were not going to figure in the presidential 
discussions. Now they did - as Mr Schultz confirmed, 
while refusing to divulge what had been said. Fired 
by the injustice done to their own, journalists and 
editors filed a stream of articles criticising 
Indonesia's record on human rights, corruption and 
East Timor, and ridiculing President Reagan's claims 
about freedom in South East Asia. 
"Quiet Diplomacy" 
For once, the very special diplomatic assumptions 
that govern European as well as American and Au~­
tral ian relations with Indonesia have been caught 1n 
a glare of publicity. Western governments practise 
with Indonesia what they call "Quiet Diplomacy". 
This is apparently based upon the theory that ordin-
ary diplomatic discourse is ineffective. 'Progress' 
on any number of fronts - extrajudicial executions, 
trade relations, the invasion of territory belonging 
to other countries - can only be made by offering 
extraordinary concessions to Jakarta's sensibilities 
and interests. 
In practise •Quiet Diplomacy" consists of saying 
absolutely nothing in public about anything of im-
portance to do with Indonesian relations, unless 
what can be said happens to be highly complimentary. 
Every Western government behaves as if it is under 
an obligation to abjure any form of public criticism 
that might provoke Jakarta into taking exactly the 
sort of unreasonable action it has just taken 
against Australian tou~•sts and journalists. 
Such deference is ~ossibly unique in Western 
relations with developing countries, and it is 
difficult to explain, let alone justify. It is quite 
out of proportion to the consideration shown to 
nations such as India that are equally strategic and 
large. Yet India does not require everyone else to 
adopt special forms of diplomacy. Nobody expects 
governments to conduct their business in public ••• 
What is so different about Indonesia that it must be 
conciliated and its affairs handled in an especially 
quiet voice? 
Perhaps, in revealing briefly to the world the 
alarming lack of official concern for individual and 
civil liberties in Indonesia, President Reagan's 
visit may do a little good, after all. It seems that 
the Australian government might now like to be 
slightly more critical of its neighbour, while the 
unwelcome "hurricane• of press criticism to which Mr 
Kusumaatmaja referred may even have fluttered a tiny 
bit the composure of Indonesia's politicians and 
generals. 
One should not be too hopeful. Questioned about 
the controversy by the New York Times, Mr Joop Ave, 
Indonesia• s Director of Tourism, said disarmingly: 
"We are not going to be bothered by what happens to 
one or two journalists. Big deal. We're talking 
about big country relations here. ( ... ) Americans 
should give us a chance. They should not try to 
impress upon us the need for change according to the 
rules of another country. It's impossible.• (NYT, 
May 1 1986.) 
The trouble is that the Indonesian government 
wants to be treated differently from all countries. 
This assumption ought to have been challenged a long 
time ago. Indonesia cannot indefinitely have it both 
ways - asking its friends abroad to treat ft as an 
upcoming major power, and at the same time as a 
special case needing tender consideration. Optimists 
should hope that Australia and the United States, 
both snubbed, may dare now to twitch at the veils of 
secrecy which clothe Indonesia's treatment of its 
own people - not least the hidden lives of Timor. 
Pressure from 
the Hill 
REAGAN'S VISIT TO BALI - Part 2 
To coincide with President Reagan's stopover in 
Bali, 125 American Congressmen and 23 Senators sent 
separate letters asking the President to raise the 
issue of East Timor during his talks with President 
Soeharto. We reproduce these documents below: 
LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM 125 CONGRESSMEN 
Dear Mr President, 
We continue to be deeply concerned about the 
human tragedy in East Timor, the predominantly Roman 
Catholic former Portuguese colony invaded by Indon-
esia in 1975. Since then, an estimated 100,000 East 
Timorese - nearly one-sixth of East Timor's original 
population - have perished from the combined effects 
of the Indonesian occupation. Armed conflict in the 
territory persists, as do reports of atrocities such 
as disappearances, summary executions, torture, and 
forced birth control. 
Highly regarded international church sources 
confirm that serious human rights abuses continue. 
While there has been some ostensible improvement in 
access to East Timor by international humanitarian 
agencies, such access remains limited. Unrestricted 
access is critical in light of reports that 
malnutrition-related deaths of children persist in 
at least some areas. 
We therefore respectfully urge you to give 
serious attention to the East Timor situation in 
meetings that you and the Presidential party will 
have with Indonesian leaders during your visit to 
Indonesia in May. As the first US President to visit 
Indonesia since the December 1975 invasion of East 
Timor, your interest could contribute significantly 
to efforts that might prevent further bloodshed and 
misery in East Timor. 
Secretary of State Shultz deserved credit for 
raising the issue of human rights in East Timor 
during his July 1984 visit to Jakarta; that same 
month, Pope John Paul II expressed deep concern over 
the suffering of the people of East Timor. Further, 
in April 1985, British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher raised humanitarian and human rights issues 
regarding East Timor during a visit to the Indon-
esian capital. 
Continued fighting in the territory between the 
Indonesian military and the East Timorese resistance 
is reason for concern, coupled with persistent re-
ports from Amnesty International and other organiz-
ations of human rights violations. Accounts of 
various pressures and intimidation directed at the 
Roman Catholic Church in East Timor by Indonesian 
authorities are most disturbing. Also troubling is 
the matter of political prisoners. While the offic-
ial number of East Timorese political detainees has 
dropped, Amnesty International and others report 
that a significant number of detainees purportedly 
released have in fact been moved to less identifi-
able places of detention. There have been accounts 
of "hidden• prisons and detention camps to which 
international humanitarian groups still do not have 
access. 
Further alarming is the news of a population 
limitation program introduced in East Timor by the 
Indonesians. Authoritative church sources say that 
this program is being carried out often without the 
consent or knowledge of the mostly rural population 
of East Timor. A program of this nature carried out 
by the invaders themselves has troubling implicat-
ions, considering the huge death toll in East Timor 
since the invasion and the comparatively small orig-
inal population. Mr President, we ask you to urge 
the Indonesian government to put an end to populat-
ion limitation measures and practices in East Timor 
that do not have the full consent and knowledge of 
those directly concerned. 
We seek efforts to ensure the continuation and 
expansion of access to East Timor by international 
humanitarian agencies, with guarantees of freedom of 
movement for these agencies so that the full range 
of their activities may be carried out to the great-
est possible extent. In particular, all prisoners 
and detainees should be assured timely visitation. 
In addition, we strongly believe that the Roman 
Catholic Church in East Timor should be guaranteed 
an existence free from official pressure and intim-
idation. Finally, the United States should encourage 
efforts to bring about a fair and peaceful settle-
ment of the East Timor conflict. 
We fully appreciate the importance of friendly 
relations with Indonesia. We are also aware that 
there will be many other issues on your agenda when 
you travel to Bali. However, we respectfully ask you 
to add the plight of the people of East Timor to 
your agenda. You have a special opportunity to bring 
to bear on the Timor tragedy the prestige and moral 
influence of the United States. 
LETTER TO MR GEORGE SCHULTZ FROM 23 SENATORS 
Dear Mr Secretary, 
We commend you for publicly expressing United 
States concern for human rights in East Timor during 
your April, 1984 visit to Indonesia. Since that 
visit, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and 
Pope John Paul II, among others, have expressed a 
similar concern to President Soeharto. The repeated 
raising of the issue by world leaders has led to 
some improvement of the human rights situation in 
East Timor, but a number of serious problems remain. 
As you know, violence and repression have plagued 
East Timor since the 1975 Indonesian invasion of the 
island. The United States should continue to encour-
age an equitable and peaceful resolution to the on-
going armed conflict in East Timor. The immediate 
problems faced by the East Timorese, however, also 
demand attention. Specifically: 
1. While public pressure has led to the release of 
some political prisoners, Amnesty International 
reports that many of those said by the government 
to have been released have in reality been trans-
ferred to secret detention camps. International 
humanitarian organizations do not have access to 
these "resettlement centers" because the Indones-
ian government does not acknowledge their exist-
ence. Since these political prisoners are isolated 
from world attention, the Indonesian government 
need not abide by international standards govern-
ing the treatment of prisoners. Many reports of 
torture in these "resettlement centers• have been 
received by Amnesty International. 
2. The occupying Indonesian forces reportedly continue 
to intimidate both clergy and church members of 
East Timor's Roman Catholic Church. For the predom-
inantly Roman Catholic East Timorese, such pressure 
only increases the tension between themselves and 
the Indonesians. 
3. Though the famine in East Timor has ended, mal-
nutrition and related health problems still exist 
in some areas. A lack of cooperation between Indon-
esian authorities and international relief agencies 
could spell disaster for the East Timorese. 
4. When Portugal granted East Timor its independence 
in 1975, many families were separated. Those East 
Timorese still waiting to join their relatives in 
Portugal have suffered from unnecessarily slow 
action by Indonesian officials. Resolution of these 
family reunification cases would be an important 
· humanitarian gesture by Indonesia. 
We respectfully urge you to raise these concerns 
with the Indonesian government during your upcoming 
visit to the annual ASEAN meeting. We recognize the 
value of the relationship between Indonesia and the 
United States. Our friendship with Indonesia can only 
be strengthened by forthright discussion of the on-
going problems faced by the people of East Timor. 
UN Talks reach core issues 
In their face to face talks sponsored by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, the Portuguese and Indon-
esian governments have until now addressed issues -
such as human and religious rights - which, however 
important, are essentially peripheral to a final 
resolution of the problem. 
During the summer several new sessions of talks are 
planned, however. These will address the fundamental 
questions of sovereignty--ailcJ self-determination. 
What chance of progress? 
In recent weeks Portuguese leaders, including 
both the President and the Prime Minister, have been 
rather assertive in affirming their cornnitment to a just solution and to the principle of self-
determination for East Timor. (See, for example, 
remarks made by the Portuguese Prime Minister on the 
BBC, reported elsewhere in this issue.) 
This confidence is slightly surprising, because 
the principle of self-determination is central to 
the problem, and virtually no observers of Indon-
esian affairs would currently expect Jakarta's pos-
ition on sovereignty to soften. So distant from each 
other are the two government's positions that this 
would seem to represent an almost intractable 
obstacle to any settlement. 
Yet United Nations officials close to the talks 
also continue to believe that positive developments 
are possible - while they admit serious differences 
still separate the two parties and that little time 
remains before the next Session of the UN General 
Assembly, when Mr Perez de Cuellar's current mandate 
will end. 
(It is st i 11 not known whether the Secretary-
General intends to stand for a second period of 
office. It 1s thought, however, that this year he 
will issue a more definitive report on the progress 
of the talks than in 1984 and 1985.) 
Still Quieter Diplomacy? 
We have recently heard whisper of one proposal 
that would bridge the chasm, and we report it here -
not because we have any evidence to say it is being 
floated seriously, but because it illustrates how 
many ingenious ways may be found to skin a cat ... 
whether or not the animal itself is consulted. 
The idea goes like this: 
What if? .•• 
What if Indonesia, which is to hold elections in 
1987, was to consider the elections in East Timor as 
an act of self-determination? To Indonesians, there 
would be no need to explain the difference, and much 
embarressment might be saved ••• always supposing, of 
course, that the East Timorese agree to vote as the 
authorities anticipate. 
Then, what if the United Nations agreed to send 
observers to this election and report their findings 
to the world? Thus Indonesia's abuse of internation-
al law could be confronted discreetly ••• And Portugal 
could transfer to the United Nations its burden of 
responsibility for the Timorese people. What more 
honourable and dignified retreat could there be from 
a problem that Portugal is powerless to resolve by 
its own means? 
Such a plan would leave more than a few meaty 
questions hanging in the air. One wonders, for 
example, who would provide the election officers, 
and who would count the votes. And how many 
candidates would be allowed to stand - and whether 
they could campaign for independence. 
Two comparisons spring to mind. One is the sad 
story of Irian Jaya, which was transferred to Indon-
esian sovereignty by the United Nations after a-
'consultation' of the population which is generally 
agreed now to have been deeply flawed and supported 
by coercion. 
The second is the story of the last elections in 
East Timor, held in May 1982, and described in glow-
ing terms by the then Minister of Defence, General 
M. Jusuf, who said: "the general elections in East 
Timor prove to the outside world that the Indonesian 
government has granted the people of East Timor 
their proper democratic rights". 
This was somewhat short on truth. Firstly, no 
Timorese parties were in a position to stand - since 
Fretilin, the UDT and Apodeti were all banned after 
1975. None of the three parties that were permitted 
to field.__,)candidates had roots in the territory. 
Secondly, though the elect;ons were not observed 
(General Yusuf's 'outside world' was not present), 
there was evidence of fraud - if only because the 
number of votes cast was greater than the number of 
voters registered. Golkar, the government's own 
party, won a massive victory by polling a safe 99.4% 
of the votes. Perhaps more accurately than he 
intended, the Deputy Governor at the time, Mr Lopez 
da Cruz, declared to Sinar Harapan on polling day in 
Dili that •the only contest between the contestants 




The second INGI Conference was held in Holland on 
April 28th and 29th, attended by NGOs from Europe, 
the United States, Japan and Indonesia. More than 
half the part icipants were representatives of Indon-
esian NGOs. 
The meeting drew up a document for submission to 
the Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 
the consortium that grants most government to gov-
ernment aid to Indonesia. IGGI wi 11 hold its annual 
meeting in Amsterdam on June 18th and 19th. 
INGI 1 s aim was to produce a systematic set of 
development alternatives for Indonesia, in the hope 
of influencing the direction and quality of IGGI 
programmes. Discussions lasting for two days centred 
on the development of the domestic economy, popular 
participation, human rights, transmigration, and 
environmental issues. The final document was agreed 
by the conference and accepted by the Dutch Minister 
of Justice on behalf _ of the Minister for Overseas 
Development, who agreed to present it to the IGGI. 
Though the conference did not address directly 
the issue of East Timor, it did express its concern 
about widespread violations of "the right not to be 
subjected to torture, violence, extrajudicial 
executions or disappearances,• and affirmed •the 
right of cultural communities to preserve their 
identity, traditions, language, cultural heritage 
and customary laws and the right to determine for 
themselves the manner and extent of their relation-
ship with the larger society.• 
Those present undertook to publicise the contents 
of the INGI document with their respective govern-
ments. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO REPORT ON 
EAST TIMOR 
The Political Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament has decided to prepare a report on the 
situation in Indonesia, including Irian Jaya and 
East Timor. The report will focus particularly on 
human rights issues, and the Committee expects to 
draw, among others, upon information from NGO's. 
The Committee will be chaired by Mrs van den Heuvel, 
Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights of 
the Political Affairs Committee. Mrs van den Heuvel 
belongs to the Dutch Labour Party. 
The report will first go as a draft to the Political 
Affairs Co1T111ittee, which wil 1 discuss and possibly 
amend it. In the form of a draft resolution, it will 
then be presented to the European Parliament, which 
will debate it in plenary session. The resolution 
will be accompanied by an explanatory statement con-
taining the substance of the Committee's findings; 
but this statement will not itself be debated. 
Groups interested in providing information to the 
Committee should write initially to Mr Etienne 
Boumans of the Human Rights Unit, at the European 
Parliament, Centre Europeen, Plateau du Kyrchberg, 
BP 1601, Luxembourg. 
PORTUGUESE ' PRIME ·MINISTER ON BBC 
Guest on the BBC's phone-in programme It's Your 
World on May 11th, Professor Anibal Cavaco Silva, 
Portugal's Prime Minister, defined his government's 
attitude towards East Timor. Among other things, he 
said: 
"The Portuguese government thinks that the people 
of East Timor have the right to self-determination." 
Of the UN-sponsored talks with Indonesia, he said 
these sought "first of all to answer to the humanit-
arian problems that the people of East Timor are 
suffering, and to reduce the limitations on freedom 
for the people living there. We do hope that in the 
near future it wi 11 be poss i b 1 e to reach an under-
standing under which the people are given the right 
to express their desire to be part of Indonesia or 
to be separate from Indonesia." 
Finally he said that "it is very important to 
maintain strong public opinion pressure on national 
governments so that they wi 11 support the position 
of Portugal, which is the position which defends the 
right of the people of East Timor to the United 
Nations. So I appreciate everything that is done ••• 
to help not Portugal but the people of East Timor. 
We have contacted all friendly governments so that 
they will support the self-determination of the 
people of East Timor in the United Nations." 
GERMAN PRESS VISIT 
The Indonesian Embassy in Bonn has said that in July 
or August 3 West German journalists will be invited 
to East Timor. For news of this visit, contact 
Klemens Ludwig, Association for Endangered People, 
PB 2024, 3400 Gottingen, West Germany. 
REVIEW 
UDT-FRETILIN JOINT STATEMENT 
In March this year, in advance of the Presidential 
elections in Portugal, the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor (Fretilin) and the Union for a 
Democratic Timor (UDT) co-operated politically for the 
first time since they competed for power in the months 
before the Indonesian invasion in 1975. 
For East Timorese living abroad, this is obviously 
an important event. 
Tapol has now published their joint communique, and 
al so short statements issued at the same time by the 
two parties. The communique is dated March 18 1986 and 
is signed by Dr Abilio Araujo, head of Freti11n's 
external de1egation, and by Dr Moises da Costa Amaral 
President of UDT's political commission. ' 
The pamphlet, Occasional Report No. 2, is available 
from Tapol, Sa Treport St, London SW 18 2BP.(4 pages.) 
UK Government on Arms Exports 
Replying to a constituent who wrote to his MP, Mr 
Timothy Renton, the British Minister who deals with 
South East Asia, has clarified the situation with 
regard to the reports of several large arms sales to 
Indonesia which we described in the last issue of 
East Timor Link. We reproduce relevant extracts for 
readers interested in this question: 
"Britain has sold Rapier air defence systems to 
Indonesia. But the Government has received no export 
licence applications for the sale of further Hawk 
aircraft or the supply of Scorpion tanks to 
Indonesia." 
The letter (dated March 17 1986) restated Britain's 
defence of arms exports : "when sold to meet 
legitimate defence needs, they help to deter 
aggression and permit other countries to exercise 
their right to self-defence". Furthermore, "Our 
customers are sovereign states who have the right to 
decide their own public expenditure priorities ••• " 
On the other hand: "all potential defence sales are 
considered individually on their merits. Each 
transaction is subject to strict export licensing 
procedures, including an assessment of the foreign 
policy implications. We pay particular attention to 
the human rights record of the country concerned and 
••. do not agree to the supply of equipment which, 
in our judgement, is likely to be used for internal 
repression." 
REVIEW 
ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 
In January 1986 the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) published the latest in its series 
of reports on the situation in East Tfmor. It covers 
ICRC's work throughout 1985, and sets out its aims 
and financing requirements for 1986. 
As in the past, the report is written with more than 
one eye on the need for neutrality. It documents, 
sparsely but factually, each of the main activities 
to which the ICRC is committed in East Timor: 
ICRC Activities 
Visits to detainees: 2 of the 3 visits planned 
for 1985 took place, and in all 279 detainees were 
seen; aid was given to many of them, as wel 1 as to 
families. 
Re-uniting families: under this progranme 9 
people returned to Portugal and 5 to Australia; the 
ICRC also agreed, acting on the request of both 
Portugal and Indonesia, to arrange the return to 
Portugal of up to 400 ex-civil servants, a project 
funded by the UN High Conmission for Refugees; 
- Transmitting Red Cross messages: during the year 
the ICRC and the Indonesian Red Cross forwarded 
10,000 messages, mainly on behalf of detainees and 
people on Atauro island. 
- Relief on Atauro: the relief programme on Atauro 
continued. However, the number of people held on the 
island by the Indonesian authorities dropped during 
the year from 1,267 to 940 (December 1985), and the 
Mr Renton then considered the case of Indonesia. "In 
considering export licence applications for 
Indonesia we must take account of Indonesia's role 
as an important regional power in South East Asia. 
The security and stability of Indonesia, and of the 
region of the Association of South East Asian 
nations as a whole, is of growing significance to 
the international community, not least to Britain 
which has substantial interests there.• 
Finally the Minister referred to East Timor, where 
"our policy ••• is to support the efforts of the 
United Nations Secretary-General to promote contacts 
between the Indonesian and Portuguese Governments 
aimed at achieving a just settlement in East Timor. 11 
He concluded by saying "we have gone to some 
lengths, both on our own account _ and with our 
European Conmunity partners, to inform the 
Indonesian Government of our concern for human 
rights issues. I discussed the whole question of 
human rights with senior Indonesian officials when I 
visited Jakarta last November." 
Readers should note that previous experience 
suggests that this sort of issue needs to be 
monitored. While strictly true, this letter means 
only what it says - that requests for export 
licences have not been received. It is quite 
possible, for example, that applications are about 
to be made. 
ICRC also began to distribute food rations to the 
people who have been returned to the main island. 
Each was given 2 months' supply (11.4 tonnes was 
distributed in all.) 
Surveys on the main island: Following up the 
nutritional survey of 25 villages in May-June 1985, 
a new assessment was conducted in December among 
some 17,000 inhabitants of Raifusa, Dilor, Luro, 
Parlamento/Moro and 11 iomar "which appeared vulner-
able at the time". The medico-nutritional situation 
was evaluated by measuring the bracchial circum-
ference and height of ch 11 dren from 1 to 6 years, 
and a general assessment of health, medical facil-
ities and food supplies etc was made. In the light 
of the survey's findings, the authorities "informed 
the ICRC that they would take the appropriate meas-
ures to remedy the situation ff necessary" and "A 
special committee, consisting of representatives of 
the East Timor health and agricultural services, was 
established ••• and is working in close co-operation 
with the ICRC and the Indonesian Red Cross". 
Survey of Returnees from Atauro. In April, ICRC 
staff visited 600 people who had been placed in the 
Ainaro/Dare region after detention on Atauro; 
another 668 in the Cailaco region during October; 
and about 85 in Manatuto. "About 1,300 of these 
people were seen by the ICRC in 1985. Approximately 
2,800 people were yet to be visited.• (p.16) 
Each of these programmes is to be continued into 
1987. 
8 pages, map, photographs may be had on request 
from the ICRC, 17 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
INDONESIA PREPARES FOR NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN HARARE 
According to a report in the Jakarta Post (May 
16), Indonesia is to open an Embassy in Zimbabwe to 
prepare for the Non-A 1 igned Summit which wi 11 take 
place in Harare fn August of this year. Zimbabwe is 
currently the Movement's President. 
At the last meeting in Luanda East Timor became a 
contentious issue, not just because it was the sub-ject of an unexpectedly long debate, but because the 
Movement's i nab fl i ty to reach a consensus may have 
persuaded Indonesia not to put itself forward as a 
candidate for the Presidency. 
The Non-Aligned Movement has symbolic importance 
for Indonesia, because the Movement was founded at a 
meeting in Bandung in Java. 
"God willing, the issue will be resolved this year" 
Indonesia is clearly preparing for a big push on 
Timor: the Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar Kusumaat-
maja has said as much on several occasions. To plan 
Indonesia's diplomatic strategy on East Tfmor, fn 
March he met his country's Ambassadors for Europe fn 
Geneva, and then those for Japan, India, Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and Latin American 
countries in New York. 
Now, Dr Mochtar also announced, Mr Hasjin Djalal, 
Head of the Foreign Ministry's Research & Develop-
ment Bureau, will be going to 7 African capitals to 
exp 1 a in Indonesia's record on East Timor and per-
suade them the support Jakarta at the UN. 
Nevertheless, the government must be unsure. Dr 
Mochtar refused to say whether the Indonesian dele-
gation will be led by President Soeharto. "You' 11 
have to guess,• he told journalists. The question fs 
interesting. President Soeharto would surely not go 
to Harare ff he was likely to be publicly embarress-
ed over East Timor. 
On the other hand, his presence might inh1b1t 
other delegations from pressing so sensitive an 
issue. 
The government of Mr Mugabe f s known to be sympa-
thet fc to East Timor's case. Though not officially 
accredited, Fretilin will also be present in Harare. 
It will clearly be an opportunity for both sides to 
test their support before the UN General Assembly is 
convened in the Autumn. 
HELDER CAMARA VISITS TIMORESE REFUGEES 
Dom Helder Camara, the Archbishop of Olinda & 
Recife in Brazil - "Bishop of the Favelas" - visited 
Portugal in April and met the Timorese refugees· in 
the 'Valo do Jamor' Camp fn Lisbon. 
"I have heard here," he told them, "that the 
bishops of Portugal, Indonesia, Holland, Japan and 
the United States have already demonstrated their 
solidarity with the people of East Timor. But I have 
not heard the Brazilians speak. When I return to my 
country I will look into this, and I can promise you 
that the Brazilian Bishops' Conference will take a 
position on the subject of your legitimate 
aspirations." 
Dom Helder went on: "I have already been together 
with the Timorese in Australia. This invasion was an 
aberration. You have the right to remain in your own 
country and to choose independence. What you desire 
is so just." (A Paz e Possfvel em Timor Leste, May) 
TirrDr Link is published by the 
catholic Institute for International 
Relations in associatioo with 
the English edition of Em TirrDr Leste 
A Paz e Possivel. 
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